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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : Case No. 940104-CA 
v. : Priority No. 2 
GEORGE CLAY LANDRITH, : 
Defendant/Appellant : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for aggravated assault, 
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
103(1) (b) (1990), entered as a class A misdemeanor pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-406 (1990). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the case pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Was sufficient evidence introduced at the bench trial to 
prove defendant committed an aggravated assault? This Court will 
not set aside a bench trial verdict for lack of sufficient 
evidence unless the verdict is clearly erroneous and the result 
is against the clear weight of the evidence or if the Court 
finds, by definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made. State v. Pelton, 801 P.2d 184, 185 (Utah App. 1990). 
However, defendant's sufficiency of the evidence claim is 
deemed waived and should not be reviewed by this Court if 
defendant has failed to marshal all evidence in support of the 
guilty verdict. State v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604, 607-8 (Utah App. 
1994) . 
Did the trial court apply the wrong legal standard in 
determining the mental state defendant must possess in order to 
commit an aggravated assault? 
Is Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(1) (c) (1991), the statute 
setting forth the elements of assault, so vague that it violates 
the due process of law protections of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the 
Utah Constitution? 
These questions are questions of law reviewed under a 
"correctness of error" standard, without deference to the 
district court's legal conclusions. State v. James, 819 P.2d 
781, 796 (Utah 1991). The trial court's underlying factual 
findings are viewed with deference and must be upheld on appeal 
unless clearly erroneous. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270 
n.ll (Utah 1993). 
However, has defendant's failure to raise the statutory 
constitutional question in the proceedings below, precluded this 
Court from reviewing the issue? Absent a showing of plain error 
or exceptional circumstances, defendant's failure to raise the 
claim of unconstitutionality of the assault statute, Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-102(1) (c) (1991), bars review of that claim by this 
Court. State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1991). 
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Has defendant established reversible error on the basis that 
the trial court, in the bench trial, took defendant's motion to 
dismiss under advisement so as to permit submission of legal 
memorandum, permitted defendant to present his case, and 
thereafter ruled that a prima facie case had been established? 
State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1992); State v. Smith, 
675 P.2d 521, 524 (Utah 1983). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The relevant state and federal constitutional provisions are 
reproduced in Addendum A. Relevant state statutes are reproduced 
in the text of the brief or in Addendum B. State rules of 
appellate and criminal procedure are reproduced in Addendum C. 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103. Aggravated assault (1990). 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits 
assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to 
another; or 
(b) uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-
601 or other means or force likely to produce death or 
serious bodily injury. 
(2) Aggravated assault is a third degree felony. 
Utah Code Ann., § 76-5-102. Assault (1991). 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or 
violence, to do bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of 
immediate force or violence, to do bodily 
injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or 
violence, that causes or creates a 
substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 23, 1992, an arrest warrant and information 
were filed in the Fourth Circuit Court in Utah County, alleging 
that defendant, George Clay Landrith, had committed an aggravated 
assault against his wife and his wife's daughter approximately 
three weeks earlier (R. 1-4). Defendant was bound over on the 
charges, arraigned and pled not guilty (R. 18-21). 
A bench trial was held on April 27, 1993, and at the close 
of the State's case defendant made a motion to dismiss alleging 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(1) (c) (1990), required specific intent 
to injure and that the prosecution had failed to establish that 
fact (R. 30; T. 50-2) .x The trial judge took the issue under 
advisement and defense counsel proceeded with the defendant's 
case (R. 30, 55-6) . 
After trial, on May 7, 1993 and May 13, 1993, the prosecutor 
and the defense, respectively, filed trial memoranda on the issue 
of intent (R. 38, 52). On May 19, 1994, the trial judge found 
defendant guilty of aggravated assault and ruled that defendant, 
although not intending to harm anyone, did intend to swing a 
dangerous weapon, a pick-ax, therefore, possessing the requisite 
intent to commit the crime (R. 54-5). At the sentencing hearing 
defendant was sentenced to the next lower category of offense, a 
class A misdemeanor (R. 67) . 
xThe transcript of the trial, although marked as Record No. 
108, does not have each page of the transcription separately marked 
with record numbers. For clarity, the State will refer to the 
pages in the transcript as they are paginated in the transcript 
rather than as record pagination. 
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Defendant filed a motion for new trial alleging the trial 
judge improperly interpreted the intent element of the aggravated 
assault statute (R. 73) . The motion for new trial was denied and 
defendant filed this appeal (R. 94). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In the late afternoon of August 31, 1992, defendant and his 
wife had an argument during which defendant called his wife a 
liar and hypocrite and insisted that his wife, "testify in the 
name of Jesus Christ," that she was a liar and a hypocrite (T. 
12). Defendant warned his wife that if she or her ten year-old 
daughter2 J.O. ever interfered with him regarding any children 
the defendant and his wife might have, defendant would, "tear 
[them] up one side and down the other," (T. 12). Defendant left 
the home and later returned to resume a religious activity, 
family home evening (T. 11-14). Defendant told his family he 
wanted to take them someplace beautiful (T. 14). He drove his 
wife and his two step-daughters, six year-old L.O and J.O. to a 
cemetery (T. 14) .3 There was little natural light and it was 
getting dark in the cemetery when defendant, his wife and step-
daughters exited the car (T. 15). Defendant took a pick-ax from 
the trunk of the car (R. 55). L.O. began to cry and got back 
2Defendant and his wife have no children together. 
Defendant's wife, and one of her five children, are the victims of 
the aggravated assault in this case (T. 11-14). The minor children 
are not referred to by name in the trial court's decision and will 
be referred to by initials only in the State's brief. 
3There is inconsistency in the victims' statements as to 
whether or not Mrs. Landrith's granddaughter was also with them at 
the cemetery. 
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into the car (R. 55). Defendant told his wife and J.O. to follow 
him into the cemetery; he told them he would not hurt them (R. 
55). At a remote grave site defendant, without warning, began 
swinging the pick-ax in the direction of J.O. (R. 55). The ax 
passed within twelve inches of the child (R. 55). Defendant was 
swinging the ax in a vertical arching motion, swinging toward the 
ground (R. 54-5). The child ran behind her mother and defendant 
changed the direction of the ax towards his wife (R. 54). The ax 
passed within twelve inches of defendant's wife (R. 54). 
Defendant became increasingly agitated as he swung the ax, all 
the while exclaiming, "We do this to the name of Jesus Christ," 
(R. 54). Although defendant did not hurt, nor touch, the victims 
with the ax, defendant's wife testified, "I thought I going to be 
hurt," (T. 20). The trial judge, in specifically finding no 
physical injury, held: 
[N]or does the Court find that he intended to hurt 
them. However, as fact finder in this case, the Court 
finds that the State has proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt that by his intentional acts, the defendant 
created a substantial risk of bodily injury to the 
victims, and that he did so with the use of a dangerous 
weapon, i.e., a pick-ax. 
(R. 54) . 
After defendant stopped swinging the ax he walked back to 
the car, his wife and J.O. following (T. 20). They returned to 
the house where they continued the family home evening lesson (T. 
21). Defendant then left the house (T. 21). Defendant's wife 
retrieved the ax from the garage and took it to the house of the 
family's religious counselor (T. 21). When she returned home 
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she telephoned her son (T. 21). Defendant returned to the home, 
picked up the phone and began yelling at the wife's son (T. 22) . 
Defendant told his wife he wanted a divorce, that he was going to 
take his wife's name off the deed to the house, control all the 
money and cancel his wife's classes at Brigham Young University 
(T. 22). Defendant's step-daughter CO. then said something to 
defendant and defendant pulled his fist back as if to hit her; 
instead of striking CO. defendant began pounding his fist into 
his other hand (T. 22). 
Defendant periodically would leave the room and return to 
confront his wife and her children (T. 22). Defendant then began 
yelling at a house-guest calling him an "eavesdropper" and 
ordered him to leave (T. 22). 
Defendant went upstairs at which time, his wife, in fear for 
herself and her children, packed some belongings fled her home 
(T. 22-3). She subsequently took her children out-of-state 
because, "...I felt the immediate danger that I perceived was 
here and I started just, you know, looking for a job and a place 
to stay. And I was pretty much consumed with just getting my 
family back together at that particular time," (T. 23). 
Defendant alleges that he had no intent to hurt his wife or 
his ten year-old stepdaughter (Appl. Br. 9). Defendant insists 
that the pick-ax was a visual aid for his family home evening 
lesson on reverence and that he had no intent to hurt or frighten 
anyone (Appl. Br. 18-9), and therefore, he cannot be legally be 
convicted of aggravated assault. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
Defendant, in challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on 
appeal, must first marshal all the evidence supporting his 
conviction and then show how that evidence, even in a light most 
favorable to the conviction, is against the clear weight of the 
evidence or that a mistake has been made. Defendant has failed 
to marshal any evidence and he has not, nor can he, show his 
conviction is a mistake or against the clear weight of the 
evidence by a mere recitation of his theory of the case. 
In a variation of his sufficiency of the evidence claim, 
defendant alleges the trial court used the wrong legal standard 
in determining the intent or mental state defendant must possess 
in order to commit an aggravated assault. However, no such error 
was committed by the trial court as the assault statute does not 
set forth a specific element of criminal responsibility and is 
subject to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (1990), 
providing that criminal responsibility involves a culpable mental 
state of intent, knowledge or recklessness. Defendant has failed 
to show that the trial judge's determination of facts, i.e., 
defendant was aware of what he was doing and intended to commit 
the acts at issue, do not equate to intent, knowledge or 
recklessness and are, therefore, clearly erroneous. 
POINT II 
The trial court properly determined, regardless of 
defendant's intent to harm, that a pick-ax constitutes a 
8 
dangerous weapon for purposes of the aggravated assault statute. 
The statute provides that any item, depending on how it is used, 
may be a dangerous weapon for purposes of an aggravated assault. 
Defendant has failed to provide any authority to establish that 
the trial judge's determination of the facts, i.e., a pick-ax 
swung within inches of a frightened victim is capable of causing 
serious bodily injury, was erroneous. 
POINT III 
Defendant's failure to raise, in the trial court, a claim 
bringing into question the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-102(1)(c) (1991), for vagueness, bars review of that claim 
when raised for the first time on appeal. Defendant also fails to 
comply with the Utah State Rules of Appellate Procedure by 
providing this Court with basis for raising the issue for the 
first time on appeal. 
POINT IV 
Defendant's analysis fails to establish a connection between 
the facts which constituted reversible error in State v. Emmett, 
839 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1992), and the facts of this case. Here, 
the trial judge's decision, in a bench trial and after the State 
had established a prima facie case, to take defendant's motion to 
dismiss under advisement in order to provide counsel an 
opportunity to fully brief and submit argument on the legal issue 
of intent, is not error. Defendant has not demonstrated any 
prejudice resulting from the trial judge's decision and therefore 
any alleged error is harmless error. Id. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE 
IN SUPPORT OF HIS CLAIM THAT THE STATE HAS 
FAILED TO PROVE BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
DEFENDANT COMMITTED AGGRAVATED ASSAULT. 
Defendant's brief fails to conform with the requirements of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure in several respects,4 
however, it is defendant's failure to comply with the marshaling 
requirement that prevents further review of defendant's 
sufficiency of the evidence claims. State v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 
604, 607-8 (Utah App. 1994) ("In challenging the sufficiency of 
the evidence, defendant carries a heavy burden. Defendant must 
'marshal all the evidence supporting the...verdict...and show how 
this marshaled evidence is insufficient to support the verdict 
even when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
verdict.'")(citations omitted). In West Valley City v. Majestic 
Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991), the marshaling 
requirement was explained in detail: 
[T]he marshaling concept does not reflect a desire to 
merely have pertinent excerpts from the record readily 
available to a reviewing court. The marshaling process 
is not unlike becoming the devil's advocate. Counsel 
must extricate himself or herself from the client's 
defendant has failed to comply with Utah R. App. P. 24 (1994 
as amended), by failing to: list the contents of the addendum as 
required by subsection (a) (2); include a standard of appellate 
review, supporting authority, citations to the record preserving 
the issues for review or a statement of the grounds for seeking an 
issue not preserved in the trial court as required by subsection 
(5) (A) (B) ; support the statement of the case with citations to the 
record as required by (7) ; or to support the argument with a basis 
for grounds to review claims not raised in the trial court as 
required by (e). 
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shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In 
order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the 
evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive 
and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports the very findings 
the appellant resists. After constructing this 
magnificent array of supporting evidence, the 
challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the 
evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient 
to convince the appellate court that the court's 
finding resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous. 
Defendant alleges the State did not prove the elements of 
the aggravated assault statute, its requisite intent, and the 
aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. However, 
defendant's brief fails to marshal the evidence that supports the 
trial judge's decision; it merely recites defendant's trial memo 
and defendant's own testimony. Having failed to properly marshal 
the evidence supporting the trial court's decision, defendant has 
not and cannot make the required showing that the evidence in 
question, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is 
against the clear weight of the evidence or that a mistake has 
been made. Id. See also State v. Pelton, 801 P.2d 184, 185 (Utah 
App. 1990). Even if defendant's claims were not precluded from 
review pursuant to his failure to adhere to the marshalling 
requirement and appellate rules, defendant's allegations are 
wholly without merit. 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-102(1)(c) (1991) and § 76-5-
103(1)(b) (1990), quoted in their entirety above, provide; 
aggravated assault is an act, utilizing a dangerous weapon, 
committed with unlawful force or violence, that creates a 
substantial risk of bodily injury to another. Defendant alleges 
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that the State failed to introduce sufficient evidence to 
establish the elements of the crime of assault or aggravated 
assault. However, based on the evidence introduced by the State, 
the trial judge convicted defendant of aggravated assault finding 
that defendant, with a dangerous weapon (the ax), intentionally 
swung the weapon in an arching motion, the swing brought the ax 
within inches of the victims and that action created a 
substantial risk of bodily injury to the victims. Therefore, all 
elements of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-102(1) (c) (1991), assault and 
76-5-103(1) (b) (1990), aggravated assault, were proven by the 
State (R. 54). 
Defendant alleges the State did not prove the elements of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1) (b) (1991), however, defendant was 
not charged with violating subsection (b) nor was he found guilty 
of violating subsection (b). Defendant's conviction is based on 
his violation of subsection (c) and as stated above, all elements 
of that crime were established by the State. 
Defendant repeatedly states that he did not intend to harm 
the victims, however, whether or not harm was intended is 
irrelevant to the application subsection (1)(c) of the assault 
statute. It is defendant's intent to commit the physical act, 
i.e. the swinging of the ax within inches of the victims, State 
v. Howell, 554 P.2d 1326, 1328 (Utah 1976), that establishes 
criminal responsibility for purposes of the assault and 
aggravated assault statutes. Defendant has failed to show that, 
contrary to the statutory language and trial court's findings, 
12 
his conviction is clearly erroneous and the result is against the 
clear weight of the evidence. State v. Pelton, 801 P.2d 184, 185 
(Utah App. 1990)
 % 
Defendant alleges his conduct was not an act committed with 
unlawful force or violence (Appl. Br. 12). The Utah Code does not 
define "unlawful" for the purposes of the statute in question, 
however, Black's Law Dictionary defines "unlawful force" as force 
"which is employed without the consent of the person against whom 
it is directed and the employment of which constitutes an offense 
or actionable tort." Black's Law Dictionary 5th ed. Both victims 
testified that when defendant swung the ax within inches of the 
child's face, J.O. ran behind her mother for protection, at which 
point, defendant re-directed the swinging ax toward the mother 
and the child hiding behind her (T. 18, 32, 43). Such conduct 
was not authorized by the victims and is not of the kind 
ordinarily engaged in with the lawful use of a pick-ax. 
Defendant claims that swinging the ax did not create a 
substantial risk of bodily injury (Appl. Br. 12-13). Such a claim 
is also wholly without merit. The victims testified that 
defendant swung the ax several times within inches (more than 
five inches away, but less than twelve inches) from their faces 
(T. 18-19, 43) . State Farm Fire & Casualty v. Geary, 869 P.2d 
952, 957 (Utah App. 1994)(Intentional firing of a shotgun in 
victim's direction rises to level of, "an act which contains a 
'substantial probability that certain consequences will result"). 
Defendant's conduct created a substantial risk of bodily injury 
13 
to both his wife and J.O. 
On a variation of the sufficiency of the evidence claim, 
defendant alleges the trial court used the wrong standard in 
determining criminal responsibility for aggravated assault. The 
aggravated assault statute, section 76-5-103(1) (b), incorporates 
the statutory language from three other statutes: Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-102 (1) (c) (1991), the assault statute; § 76-2-102 (1990), 
criminal responsibility statute; and § 76-1-601 (1990) , the 
dangerous weapon statute, in order to define the elements of the 
crime and criminal responsibility. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-6 01 
(1990), the statute that defines a dangerous weapon, is not 
relevant to this discussion of criminal responsibility. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1) (C) (1991), establishes the 
basic elements of the crime of assault and provides in pertinent 
part, assault is an act, committed with unlawful force or 
violence, that causes or creates a substantial risk of bodily 
injury to another. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (1990), the criminal 
responsibility statute, establishes that, "Every offense not 
involving strict liability shall require a culpable mental state, 
and when the definition of the offense does not specify a 
culpable mental state and the offense does not involve strict 
liability, intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to 
establish criminal responsibility." See also State v. Rovball, 
710 P.2d 168, 170 (Utah 1985)("No culpable mental state is 
specifically defined for the crime of assault with a deadly 
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weapon under section 76-5-103 (1) (b) of the Code... [t]herefore 
[defendant] could be found criminally responsible for assault 
with a deadly weapon if his actions were intentional, knowing or 
reckless.")(emphasis added). 
Therefore, if the trial judge finds that defendant acted 
with intent, knowledge or recklessness in swinging the ax within 
inches of the victims' faces, the correct standard of criminal 
responsibility has been used. The trial court specifically held: 
[T]he State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that 
by his intentional acts, the defendant created a 
substantial risk of bodily injury to the victims, and 
that he did so with the use of a dangerous weapon, 
i.e., a pick-ax. Aggravated assault under § 76-5-
103(b) does not require a showing of specific intent. 
See State v. Howell, 554 P.2d 1326 (Utah 1976). When 
the use of a dangerous weapon is involved, general 
intent may be shown from a defendant's awareness of his 
actions. See Id. Based on the circumstances of this 
case, the Court has no difficulty in finding beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware that the 
pick-ax he utilized was a dangerous weapon, i.e., that 
it was capable of causing death or serious bodily 
injury. Further, based o[n] the circumstantial 
evidence presented, the Court finds beyond reasonable 
doubt that he was aware of the substantial risk of 
bodily injury he created to his wife and step-daughter 
by his actions. 
(R. 54)(reproduced in Addendum D)(emphasis added). 
The language of the trial court establishes both intentional 
and reckless criminal responsibility. See Howell. 554 P.2d, at 
1328 (aggravated assault does not require specific intent, but 
only general intent to commit the physical act) and State v. 
Singer, 815 P.2d 1303, 1307 (Utah 1991)(defendant can "fairly be 
expected to testify that he or she was possessed of the most 
innocuous subjective intent when he or she committed the unlawful 
15 
act") Therefore, defendant's intent to swing the act so close to 
the victims or defendant's recklessness in swinging the ax within 
inches of the victims establishes the requisite criminal 
responsibility pursuant to section 76-5-103(1) (b) . 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S DELIBERATE SWINGING OF A PICK-AX WITHIN 
INCHES OF THE VICTIMS QUALIFIES THE PICK-AX AS A 
DANGEROUS WEAPON PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-
601(5)(A) (1990). 
Defendant alleges that a pick-ax is not a dangerous weapon 
(Appl. Br. 18-19). He claims that as the victims were not hurt 
and he did not touch them that the ax is insufficient to be 
labeled a dangerous weapon. Id. However, Utah Code Annotated § 
76-1-601 (5) (a) (1990), provides: [A] "'Dangerous weapon' means 
any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury..." 
Defendant states, "counsel for Appellant has not found a 
single case in this state, where an appellant has been charged 
under the subsection charged herein, where there was a conviction 
without the actual infliction of a serious bodily injury on the 
part of a victim, unless a firearm has been the dangerous 
weapon." (Appl. Br. 16). Defendants contention that a person can 
only be charged with aggravated assault pursuant to section 76-5-
103(1) (b) if using a firearm is without merit. Items, which if 
used in a way that they could cause serious bodily injury, and 
therefore be labeled dangerous weapons, are too numerous to name. 
However cases have held that a human fist (State v. Harper, 761 
P.2d 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), a drinking glass (In re McElhanev, 
579 P.2d 328 (Utah 1978), a knife (State v. Rovball, 710 P.2d 168 
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(Utah 1985), a razor (State v. Ireland, 447 P.2d 375 (Utah 1968), 
an iron pipe (State v. Howell, 554 P.2d 1326 (Utah 1976), and an 
"ax handle-type stick of wood," (State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449 
(Utah 1986) can be dangerous weapons for purposes of the statute. 
Defendant's claim that a pick-ax swung inches from victims' faces 
is not a dangerous weapon is frivolous and wholly without merit. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF 
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-
102(1)(C) (1991), AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, 
PRECLUDES REVIEW BY THIS COURT. 
The record does not reflect that defendant ever objected, or 
otherwise preserved, any issue regarding statutory 
constitutionality for appeal. See State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 
3 61 (Utah App. 1993)(failure to properly preserve equal 
protection and due process issues constitutes waiver of those 
issues on appeal). 
In this case, defendant not only failed to properly preserve 
the issues, he failed to make any objection at all. Utah courts 
have stated: 
"A general rule of appellate review in criminal cases 
in Utah is that a contemporaneous objection or some 
form of specific preservation of claims of error must 
be made a part of the trial court record before an 
appellate court will review such claim on appeal." 
Importantly, the grounds for the objection must be 
distinctly and specifically stated. 
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989)(citations 
omitted). This rule was applied to constitutional issues raised 
for the first time on appeal, in State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 
920, 922-3 (Utah App. 1991), which held: 
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An appellate court may address a constitutional issue 
for the first time on appeal if: (1) the trial court 
committed "plain error," or (2) there are "exceptional 
circumstances." The Utah Supreme Court outlined the 
principles involved in determining whether "plain 
error" exists [holding] "The first requirement for a 
finding of plain error is that the error be 'plain,' 
i.e., from our examination of the record, we must be 
able to say that it should have been obvious to a trial 
court that it was committing error...The second and 
somewhat interrelated requirement for a finding of 
plain error is that the error affect the substantial 
rights of the accused, i.e., that the error be 
harmful...the second exception to the rule prohibiting 
consideration of issues for the first time on appeal is 
a catch-all device requiring "exceptional" or "unusual" 
circumstances. It is a safety device to make certain 
that manifest injustice does not result from the 
failure to consider an issue on appeal. 
Id., at 922-3. (citations omitted). 
Defendant has not only failed to provide evidence of 
"special circumstances" or plain error, he fails to even address 
the issue in his brief. Pursuant to defendant's failure to raise 
this claim in the trial court, he is now precluded from raising 
this issue on appeal. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH REVERSIBLE 
ERROR ON THE BASIS THAT THE TRIAL COURT, IN A 
BENCH TRIAL, TOOK HIS MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER 
ADVISEMENT PENDING SUBMISSION OF ADDITIONAL 
AUTHORITY ON A POINT OF LAW. 
Defendant cites to State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 
1992), claiming that it is reversible error for a trial judge to 
fail to rule on a motion to dismiss before a defendant presents 
his case-in chief. However, defendant's reliance on Emmett, is 
misplaced. In Emmett, the case was proceeding before a jury, not 
a bench trial like defendant's case. The court in Emmett, 
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stated, "The purpose of the rule [immediate ruling on the motion 
to dismiss] is to 'avoid forcing a defendant into going forward 
with his own evidence when the state's case is insufficient." 
Id., at 783. In defendant's case the trial court stated in its 
findings: 
The Court finds that by the close of the State's 
evidence, the State had established a prima facia case 
of Aggravated Assault as defined by the statute. 
(R. 53-4). 
The judge, at the bench trial, found that there was no 
grounds to dismiss the case for lack of evidence, he took the 
motion under advisement, however, to allow the parties to submit 
more legal analysis of the intent standard for criminal 
responsibility. Rather than rule on the motion the trial court 
stated: 
Well, counsel, I'm inclined to agree with the 
defendant. The only thing that troubles me is whether 
the--I have to disagree with one part of what you say, 
and that is I think a person can be placed in 
reasonable apprehension, which can amount to the 
necessary assault and apparent danger that's there 
without striking a blow and without cocking a gun. I 
thin that can happen. And I'm somewhat unsure in that 
area. I think, counsel, what I would like to do is 
take the matter under advisement and read some cases on 
intent and satisfy myself in that area. And so I'm 
going to do that. I'm not ready to say there is no--
the State has not proved their case beyond a reasonable 
doubt. I need to be satisfied in that area. 
(T. 55-6) . 
At that point defense counsel did not object to the trial 
judge's decision. In fact defense counsel then initiated the 
production of his case-in-chief by stating,"I would then put on 
the stand Mr. Landrith as a witness..." (T. 56). 
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Defendant did not object to the judge's decision to take the 
matter under advisement, instead he filed a memorandum on May 13, 
1993, in response to the trial judge's request (R. 52). Although 
defendant's failure to object to the trial judge's decision does 
not constitute waiver of that issue on appeal, Emmett, 839 P.2d, 
at 784, defendant should not be able to benefit from the 
additional time and legal submissions on a point of law that he 
contested and then claim on appeal that the additional time 
warrants reversal of his conviction. The facts of this case 
differ greatly with those in Emmett, and do not constitute error 
on behalf of the trial court. 
Additionally, where the State undeniably made out a prima 
facie case in its case-in-chief, and the proceeding was a bench 
trial, defendant cannot show any prejudice from the trial court's 
decision to take the motion under advisement. The error is 
harmless unless absent the error a different result would have 
occurred and such a determination should be made on the record as 
a whole. Id., 839 P.2d, at 784. Defendant has failed to show 
that absent any alleged error, the result of his trial would be 
different. See State v. Smith, 675 P.2d 521, 524 (Utah 
1983)(trial court's decision to take motion to dismiss under 
advisement after state's case-in chief is harmless error as the 
prima facie case was made before defendant's case-in-chief). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant, by failing to marshal the evidence in support of 
his claims that the State has not proven defendant committed 
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aggravated assault, deprives this Court of the opportunity to 
review the merits of those allegations. Defendant has failed to 
establish that the trial judge utilized the wrong standard of 
intent in determining defendant's guilt. Defendant's failure to 
raise, in the court below, the issue of constitutionality of the 
assault statute, § 76-5-102(1)(c), or to provide a basis for the 
failure to raise the claim below, prevents this Court from 
addressing the issue. Finally, defendant has failed to establish 
reversible error on the basis that the trial judge did not rule 
on his motion to dismiss before he proceeded with his case-in-
chief. Even if this Court determines error was committed, it is 
harmless error as defendant has failed to demonstrate any 
prejudice therefrom. 
For these reasons the State respectfully requests that this 
Court affirm defendant's conviction of aggravated assault. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21 of September, 1994. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
JJ3LTK GEORGE" ^ 
i(ssistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing motion was mailed, First-Class postage prepaid, to 
Michael D. Esplin, Attorney for Defendant, 43 East 200 North, 
P.O. Box "L", Provo, Utah 84603-0200, this <*£/ day of September, 
1994. 
22 
ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT XIV 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law. 
ADDENDUM B 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601. Definitions (1990). 
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means any item capable of causing 
death or serious bodily injury, or a facsimile or representation 
of the item, and: 
(a) the actor's use or apparent use of the item leads 
the victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause 
death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in 
any other manner that he is in control of such an item. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102. Culpable mental state required-Strict 
liability (1990). 
Every offense not involving strict liability shall require a 
culpable mental state, and when the definition of the offense 
does not specify a culpable mental state and the offense does not 
involve strict liability, intent, knowledge, or recklessness 
shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103. Definitions of "intentionally, or 
with intent or willfully"; "knowingly, or with knowledge"; 
"recklessly, or maliciously"; and "criminal negligence or 
criminally negligent." (1990). 
A person engages in conduct: 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his 
conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist 
or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and 
degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all 
the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
ADDENDUM C 
PROCEDURAL RULES 
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Utah R. App. P. 24 (1994 AS AMENDED). Briefs. 
(a) Brief of the appellant* The brief of the 
appellant shall contain under appropriate headings and 
in the order indicated: 
... 
(2) A table of contents, including the 
contents of the addendum, with page 
references. 
... 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for 
review, including for each issue: the 
standard of appellate review with supporting 
authority, and 
(A) citation to the record showing 
that the issue was preserved in the 
trial court; or 
(B) a statement of grounds for 
seeking review of an issue not 
preserved in the trial court. 
(7) A statement of the case. The statement 
shall first indicate briefly the nature of 
the case, the course of proceedings, and its 
disposition in the court below. A statement 
of the facts relevant to the issues presented 
for review shall follow. All statements of 
fact and references to the proceedings below 
shall be supported by citations to the record 
in accordance with paragraph (e) of this 
rule. 
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the 
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect 
to the issues presented, including the grounds for 
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, 
with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts 
of the record relied on. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. 
References shall be made to the pages of the original 
record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages 
of any statement of the evidence or proceedings or 
agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 
11(g). References to exhibits shall be made to the 
exhibit numbers. If reference is made to evidence the 
admissibility of which is in controversy, reference 
shall be made to the pages of the record at which the 
evidence was identified, offered, and received or 
rejected. 
ADDENDUM D 
TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
kr f(%f*H9S3 
JS THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GEORGE CLAY LANDRITH, MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NUMBER: 931400182 
Defendants. 
After full consideration of the evidence presented at the trial of this case and of the 
trial briefs submitted by both the State and the defendant, the Court finds and rules as 
follows: 
On or about August 31, 1992 the defendant drove his wife and two minor stepchildren 
to the East Lawn Memorial Hills Cemetery in Provo and parked. He retrieved a pick-ax 
from the trunk of the vehicle. The youngest stepdaughter, age 6, began to cry and went 
back into the car. The defendant asked his wife and the older stepdaughter, age 11, to 
accompany him into the cemetery and told them he would not hurt them. He then led them 
to a remote grave site. At the grave site, he raised his voice and stated "We do this to the 
name of Jesus Christ." Then, without warning, the Defendant raised the pick-ax and began 
swinging it in the direction of the 11-year-old stepdaughter. The pick-ax passed within one 
foot of her. (As the defendant was swinging in a vertical arcing motion, he was also 
swinging toward the ground, as he alleges.) The 11-year-old then moved behind her mother, 
and the defendant redirected his swinging of the pick-ax toward his wife. Again, the ax 
blade passed within one foot of the victim. Becoming increasingly agitated, he made 
repeated swings in the direction of the victims while exclaiming, "We do this to the name of 
Jesus Christ." 
The defendant did not hurt the victims, nor does the Court find that he intended to 
hurt them. However, as fact finder in this case, the Court finds that the State has proved 
beyond reasonable doubt that by his intentional acts, the defendant created a substantial risk 
of bodily injury to the victims, and that he did so with the use of a dangerous weapon, i.e., a 
pick-ax. Aggravated assault under § 76-5-103(b) does not require a showing of specific 
intent. See State v. Howell. 554 P.2d 1326 (Utah 1976). When the use of a dangerous 
weapon is involved, general intent may be shown from a defendant's awareness of his 
actions. See IcL Based on the circumstances of this case, the Court has no difficulty in 
finding beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware that the pick-ax he utilized 
was a dangerous weapon, i.e, that it was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. 
Further, based of the circumstantial evidence presented, the Court finds beyond reasonable 
doubt that he was aware of the substantial risk of bodily injury he created to his wife and 
stepdaughter by his actions. 
Finding that the defendant committed an assault as defined in Section 76-5-102, 
subsection (c), and that he did so using a dangerous weapon, the Court must find that the 
defendant is guilty of Aggravated Assault, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of 76-5-103, 
Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended. Defendant's motion to dismiss, which the Court took 
under advisement, is of course denied. The Court finds that by the close of the State's 
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evidence, the State had established a prima facia case of Aggravated Assault as defined by 
statute. 
Sentencing in this matter is set for June 21, 1993, at 8:00 a.m.. The defendant is 
ordered to be present at that time. The Court will refer this matter to the Department of 
Adult Probation and Parol for a pre-sentence investigation and report. The defendant is to 
report immediately to the department and cooperate fully with the department's agents, 
answering any questions they may have and providing all information they request. 
Counsel for the State is to prepare findings and judgement within 15 days of this 
decision consistent with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for 
approval as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum 
decision has no effect until such order is signed by the Court. 
Dated this 19th day of May, 1993. 
cc: Mariane Baldwin, Deputy Utah County Attorney 
Michael D. Esplin, Esq. 
« • « v/ v ~ 
ADDENDUM E 
RELEVANT TRIAL TRANSCRIPT 
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1 THE COURT: IF YOU'LL COME FORWARD AND RAISE 
2 YOUR RIGHT-HAND, THE CLERK WILL ADMINISTER THE OATH TO 
3 YOU. 
4 
5 SUSAN ILENE ALEXANDER LANDRITH 
6 CALLED AS A WITNESS HEREIN, HAVING BEEN DULY 
7 SWORN, WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
8 
9 THE COURT: BE SEATED HERE IN THE WITNESS 
10 CHAIR. 
11 
12 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
13 BY MS. BALDWIN: 
14 Q. WOULD YOU PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND SPELL 
15 YOUR LAST NAME FOR THE RECORD? 
16 A. SUSAN ILENE ALEXANDER LANDRITH, 
17 L-A-N-D-R-I-T-H. 
18 Q. WHAT IS YOUR OCCUPATION? 
19 A. SECRETARY. 
20 Q. WHERE DID YOU LIVE IN AUGUST OF 1992? 
21 A. 892 OSMOND LANE. 
22 Q. DID YOU LIVE BY YOURSELF OR WITH OTHER 
23 PEOPLE? 
24 A. I LIVED WITH MY HUSBAND AND MY CHILDREN. 
25 Q. AND WHO IS YOUR HUSBAND? 
CREED H. BARKER, CSR 
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1 A. GEORGE LANDRITH. 
2 Q. AND HOW MANY CHILDREN DO YOU HAVE? 
3 A. FIVE. 
4 Q. HOW OLD ARE THEY? 
5 A. PRESENTLY THEY ARE 21, 20, 16, 11, AND SEVEN. 
6 Q. HOW LONG HAVE YOU KNOWN MR. LANDRITH? 
7 A. SINCE DECEMBER 1990. 
8 Q. WHAT WAS YOUR RELATIONSHIP WITH HIM IN AUGUST 
9 OF 1992? 
10 A. WE WERE MARRIED, OR MARRIED. 
11 Q. IS HE PRESENT IN THE COURTROOM TODAY? 
12 A. YES. 
13 Q. COULD YOU IDENTIFY HIM FOR THE COURT? 
14 A. YES, HE'S SITTING THERE WITH THE DEFENSE 
15 ATTORNEY, RIGHT THERE WITH THE GLASSES. 
16 MS. BALDWIN: COULD THE RECORD REFLECT SHE'S 
17 IDENTIFIED THE DEFENDANT? 
18 THE COURT: IT MAY. 
19 Q. (BY MS. BALDWIN) DO YOU REMEMBER WHAT 
20 HAPPENED ON AUGUST 31ST OF 1992? 
21 A. YES. 
22 Q. COULD YOU DESCRIBE WHAT HAPPENED EARLY IN THE 
23 AFTERNOON ON THAT DAY? 
24 A. YES. HE AND I HAD HAD AN ARGUMENT. 
25 Q. ABOUT WHAT? 
CREED H. BARKER, CSR 
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1 A. HE WAS TRYING TO TEACH JAMIE -- OR LAUREN HOW 
2 TO USE THE TELEPHONE. AND LAUREN WANTED TO GO OUT AND 
3 PLAY. AND SHE GAVE THE PHONE TO JAMIE AND JAMIE DIALED A 
4 NUMBER, AND HE BECAME UPSET WITH JAMIE FOR INTERFERING. 
5 SO HE -- HE SPOKE RATHER SHARPLY TO HER, OR FIRMLY. 
6 PROBABLY FIRMLY. AND HE WAS ANGRY WITH HER. AND I ASKED 
7 JAMIE TO COME TO ME. HE HAD LEFT THE ROOM. I ASKED HER 
8 TO COME TO ME AND I EXPLAINED TO HER -- I TRIED TO 
9 EXPLAIN TO HER THAT HIS ANGER DIDN'T SEEM TO BE WARRANTED 
10 FOR THE SITUATION. AND HE CAME BACK IN THE ROOM AND 
11 STARTED TO -- YELLING OR TALKING LOUDLY AND FIRMLY TO ME, 
12 TOLD ME THAT I HAD CRITICIZED HIM IN FRONT OF MY 
13 CHILDREN. AND I TOLD HIM I DID NOT. AND HE SAID --
14 INSISTED THAT I DID, AND I SAID I WAS TRYING TO EXPLAIN 
15 TO HER WHAT APPEARED TO BE GOING ON FROM MY PERSPECTIVE. 
16 THEN HE STARTED CALLING ME A LIAR AND A HYPOCRITE. AND 
17 HE WANTED ME TO TESTIFY IN THE NAME OF JESUS CHRIST THAT 
18 I'M A LIAR AND A HYPOCRITE. AND I TOLD HIM I WASN'T 
19 GOING TO DO THAT. 
20 THEN AT SOME POINT HE CAME OVER TO ME AND HE 
21 SAID THAT IF IN THE FUTURE HE AND I HAD CHILDREN OF OUR 
22 OWN AND JAMIE INTERFERED, HE WOULD TEAR HER UP ONE SIDE 
23 AND DOWN THE OTHER, AND IF I INTERRUPTED HE WOULD TEAR ME 
24 UP ONE SIDE AND DOWN THE OTHER. AND THE ARGUMENT WENT ON 
25 A LITTLE BIT. AND THEN HE LEFT PROBABLY AN HOUR LATER. 
CREED H. BARKER, CSR 
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1 Q. FOR CLARIFICATION, LAUREN AND JAMIE ARE YOUR 
2 CHILDREN? 
3 A. THAT'S CORRECT. 
4 Q. HOW OLD WERE THEY AT THE TIME? 
5 A. LAUREN WAS SIX AND JAMIE 10. 
6 Q. YOU SAY THAT MR. LANDRITH LEFT. WHAT 
7 HAPPENED WHEN HE RETURNED? 
8 A. HE SEEMED TO BE CALMED DOWN. AND HE ASKED IF 
9 I WANTED TO CONTINUE WITH FAMILY HOME EVENING, AND I TOLD 
10 HIM, "YES." 
11 Q. DID YOU HAVE A FAMILY HOME EVENING LESSON 
12 THAT EVENING? 
13 A. YES. 
14 Q. WHAT WAS IT ABOUT? 
15 A. THE SUBJECT MATTER WAS TO BE REVERENCE DURING 
16 SACRAMENT MEETING. 
17 Q. HAD YOU PARTICIPATED IN PLANNING THAT FAMILY 
18 HOME EVENING? 
19 A. NO, I DID NOT. 
20 Q. AND THAT WAS STRICTLY UP TO MR. LANDRITH? 
21 A. YES. 
22 Q. ABOUT HOW LONG WAS THE LESSON; HOW MUCH TIME 
23 DID IT TAKE? 
24 A. WELL, IT'S UP FOR DEBATE. THE PART OF THE 
25 LESSON WHERE HE WAS TALKING --
CREED H. BARKER, CSR 
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1 Q. WHILE YOU WERE STILL IN THE HOUSE? 
2 A. WHILE WE WERE STILL IN THE HOUSE. IT WAS AN 
3 HOUR, HOUR AND 15 MINUTES; SOMEWHERE IN THERE. 
4 Q. WHAT HAPPENED AFTER THAT? 
5 A. HE SAID THAT HE WANTED TO TAKE US SOMEPLACE 
6 BEAUTIFUL AND THAT WE HAD BEEN THERE BEFORE. AND JAMIE, 
7 LAUREN AND I WENT WITH HIM. 
8 Q. WAS THERE ANYONE ELSE? 
9 A. WELL, I DON'T REMEMBER. JAMIE SAYS THAT WE 
10 HAD ASHLEY, WHO IS MY GRANDDAUGHTER, WITH US, AND I DON'T 
11 REMEMBER. 
12 Q. YOU DON'T REMEMBER? 
13 A. I DON'T REMEMBER HER BEING THERE, BUT JAMIE 
14 SAYS WE HAD ASHLEY WITH US. 
15 Q. YOU WENT WITH HIM TO WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS 
16 SOMEPLACE BEAUTIFUL. WHERE DID THAT TURN OUT TO BE? 
17 A. IT TURNED OUT TO BE THE CEMETERY. 
18 Q. DO YOU KNOW WHICH CEMETERY? 
19 A. I THINK THE NAME IS EAST LAWN. 
20 Q. IS THAT IN PROVO? 
21 A. IN PROVO, YES. 
22 Q. WHAT TIME OF DAY WAS THAT? 
23 A. GOSH — 
24 Q. DO YOU REMEMBER IF IT WAS LIGHT — 
25 A. IT WAS DARK OUT. I DON'T REMEMBER THE EXACT 
CREED H. BARKER, CSR 
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1 HOUR, BUT IT WAS PRETTY CLOSE TO NIGHT. THERE WAS A 
2 LITTLE BIT OF NATURAL LIGHT LEFT, BUT NOT A LOT. 
3 Q. WHAT HAPPENED WHEN YOU GOT TO THE CEMETERY? 
4 A. WHEN WE INITIALLY GOT THERE, WE SAT IN THE 
5 CAR FOR A FEW MINUTES BECAUSE THERE WERE SIX OR EIGHT 
6 DEER IN THE FIELD TO THE RIGHT OF US. AND THEN HE GOT 
7 OUT OF THE CAR FIRST AND WENT AROUND TO THE BACK. AND WE 
8 CAME AROUND, AND THEN HE CAME AROUND TO THE FRONT. AND 
9 THE GIRLS AND I STARTED GETTING OUT. I WAS ON THE 
10 PASSENGER SIDE. JAMIE AND LAUREN GOT OUT — 
11 Q. I'M GOING TO INTERRUPT YOU FOR A MOMENT. I'M 
12 HANDING YOU WHAT'S MARKED AS STATE'S EXHIBIT #2. COULD 
13 YOU TELL ME WHAT THAT IS? 
14 A. YES, THIS IS WHERE WE WERE, THE CEMETERY. 
15 Q. DOES THAT LOOK APPROXIMATELY LIKE THE AREA 
16 YOU WERE IN? 
17 A. YES. 
18 Q. SO YOU WERE IN THE PASSENGER SIDE OF THE CAR? 
19 A. YES. 
20 Q. WHEN YOU GOT OUT, WHAT HAPPENED AFTER THAT? 
21 A. I HAD -- HE WAS STANDING IN FRONT OF THE CAR 
22 ON THE PASSENGER SIDE RIGHT BY THE HEADLAMP. AND I 
23 NOTICED HE HAD THE AX IN HIS HAND. IT WAS JUST KIND OF 
24 HANGING DOWN AT HIS SIDE. 
25 Q. I'M HANDING YOU WHAT'S BEEN MARKED AS STATE'S 
CREED H. BARKER, CSR 
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1 EXHIBIT 1. DO YOU RECOGNIZE THAT? 
2 A. I DO. 
3 Q. WHAT'S THAT? 
4 A. THAT'S THE AX HE HAD WITH HIM. 
5 Q. WHAT HAPPENED AFTER THAT? 
6 A. HE ASKED ME TO COME DOWN INTO THE CEMETERY 
7 WITH HIM, AND I TOLD HIM I DID NOT WANT TO GO WITH HIM. 
8 AND THEN HE -- HE WAS KIND OF TALKING GENTLY AND JOKING. 
9 AND HE SAID, "COME ON, I'M NOT GOING TO HURT YOU." SO I 
10 WENT DOWN THERE WITH HIM. 
11 Q. WHO ELSE WAS WITH YOU, IF ANYONE? 
12 A. JAMIE WAS WITH ME, JAMIE FOLLOWED ME DOWN 
13 THERE. AND AGAIN SHE SAYS THAT I HAD ASHLEY, I WAS 
14 HOLDING ASHLEY. BUT I DON'T REMEMBER THAT PART OF IT. 
15 Q. HOW FAR IN THE CEMETERY DID YOU GO? 
16 A. I CAN'T GIVE YOU FEET ESTIMATE, BUT -- I 
17 DON'T KNOW. WE WENT DOWN TO A GRAVE MARKED WITH THE NAME 
18 LAMB, L-A-M-B. AND I DON'T KNOW HOW FAR FROM THE ROAD IT 
19 WAS. I'M NOT --
20 Q. I'M HANDING YOU WHAT'S MARKED AS STATE'S 
21 EXHIBIT #3. COULD YOU TELL ME WHAT THAT IS? 
22 A. THAT'S PRETTY MUCH WHERE WE WERE. THAT'S 
23 WHERE WE WERE. 
24 Q. THERE'S A VEHICLE THAT IS IN THAT PICTURE. 
25 DO YOU KNOW IF THAT'S APPROXIMATELY WHERE YOUR VEHICLE 
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1 WAS PARKED? 
2 A. IT'S HARD TO SAY. I MEAN I DON'T REMEMBER 
3 THE TREES, BUT I JUST REMEMBER THE GRAVE THAT WAS MARKED. 
4 Q. SO YOU WERE SURE YOU WERE AT THE "LAMB" GRAVE 
5 SITE? 
6 A. I'M POSITIVE ABOUT THAT. 
7 Q. THERE'S AN INDIVIDUAL STANDING IN THAT 
8 PICTURE. COULD YOU TELL ME WHERE YOU WERE STANDING 
9 RELATIVE TO THAT PERSON? 
10 A. RELATIVE TO HER I WAS PROBABLY STANDING A 
11 LITTLE BIT MORE TO THE RIGHT. 
12 Q. WHICH DIRECTION? 
13 A. THAT WOULD BE MORE MAYBE RIGHT HERE, MORE AT 
14 THE CORNER AND TO THE SIDE. 
15 Q. WHAT HAPPENED WHEN YOU GOT TO THE GRAVE SITE? 
16 A. UMM, HE WAS STANDING AT THE GRAVE. HE HAD 
17 GOTTEN THERE JUST, YOU KNOW, JUST A FEW SECONDS BEFORE 
18 US. AND HE WAS STANDING AT THE GRAVE AS IF LOOKING DOWN, 
19 JUST A FRONTAL VIEW OF IT. 
20 Q. WHICH DIRECTION WAS HE FACING? 
21 A. HE WAS FACING THE NAME THAT YOU COULD READ. 
22 AND I WAS STANDING TO HIS LEFT AND MY DAUGHTER JAMIE WAS 
23 STANDING TO MY LEFT. AND HE WAS TALKING ABOUT HOW 
24 BEAUTIFUL AND HOW REVERENT THE PLACE IS, AND HOW — JUST 
25 USING TERMS REGARDING REVERENCE AND SACRED. AND HE'S 
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1 TALKING VERY QUIETLY AND REVERENTLY. AND HE SAID WHEN WE 
2 MISBEHAVE OR SOMETHING LIKE THAT, IN SACRAMENT MEETING — 
3 AND THEN HE STARTED SWINGING THE AX AND HIS VOICE BECAME 
4 MORE FORCEFUL. AND HE WAS SCREAMING AND SAYING THAT WE 
5 DO THIS TO THE NAME OF JESUS CHRIST. AND HE WAS SWINGING 
6 THE AX REPEATEDLY AND SCREAMING "WE DO THIS TO THE NAME 
7 OF JESUS CHRIST." AND INITIALLY THE AX CAME DOWN IN 
8 JAMIE'S DIRECTION. AND THEN JAMIE MOVED BEHIND ME AND HE 
9 REDIRECTED THE AX SO THAT IT WAS BEING SWUNG IN MY 
10 DIRECTION. 
11 Q. HOW CLOSE DID THE AX COME TO JAMIE? 
12 A. I DON'T KNOW. TOO CLOSE AS FAR AS I'M 
13 CONCERNED, BUT I COULDN'T TELL YOU. IT JUST ALL HAPPENED 
14 SO FAST. 
15 Q. COULD YOU ESTIMATE INCHES, FEET? 
16 A. I DON'T WANT TO MAKE THAT. IT WAS LESS THAN 
17 A FOOT. I'LL JUST SAY IT WAS LESS THAN A FOOT. IT WAS 
18 CLOSE. 
19 Q. AND THE AX SWINGING IN THAT DIRECTION, IS 
20 THAT CORRECT? 
21 A. YEAH. 
22 Q. HOW MANY TIMES DID HE SWING, APPROXIMATELY? 
23 A. MANY TIMES. IT WAS MORE THAN FIVE OR SIX 
24 TIMES, IT WAS MANY TIMES. 
25 Q. AND HOW CLOSE WAS THE AX TO YOU? 
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1 A. CLOSE, TOO CLOSE. 
2 Q. INCHES? 
3 A. INCHES, WITHIN INCHES. 
4 Q. MORE THAN FIVE, LESS THAN FIVE? 
5 A. I WOULD SAY ABOUT FIVE INCHES. 
6 Q. CAN YOU DESCRIBE HOW HE WAS SWINGING; WAS HE 
7 SWINGING UP AND DOWN, BACK AND FORTH? 
8 A. HE WAS SWINGING UP AND DOWN. AND HE WOULD 
9 JUST BRING IT AROUND HIS SHOULDER, JUST LIKE YOU WOULD BE 
10 CHOPPING SOMETHING, A PIECE OF WOOD, AND JUST REPEATEDLY 
11 BRINGING IT AROUND. 
12 Q. WHERE WAS THE HIGHEST POINT OF THE SWING THAT 
13 YOU GUESS? DID HE COME OVER HIS HEAD? 
14 A. HIS HEAD? 
15 Q. YEAH, WHEN HE SWUNG IT BACK, YOU SAID — 
16 A. OH, YEAH, YEAH. I WOULD SAY. 
17 Q. WHERE WAS THE LOWEST PART? 
18 A. HE STOPPED THE AX BEFORE IT HIT THE GROUND. 
19 HE NEVER BROKE THE GROUND THAT I RECALL, AND THEN HE 
20 WOULD JUST BRING IT BACK AROUND AND SWING IT AGAIN. 
21 Q. DID HE GIVE ANY WARNING THAT HE WAS GOING TO 
22 BEGIN SWINGING THE AX? 
23 A. NO, HE DID NOT. 
24 Q. YOU SAY HE SWUNG THE AX A NUMBER OF TIMES, 
25 AND THEN WHAT HAPPENED? 
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1 A. UMM, I JUST — I HEARD LAUREN CRY — I WAS 
2 TRYING TO FIGURE OUT HOW TO GET OUT OF THE SITUATION, SO 
3 I JUST SAID, "LAUREN IS CRYING," AND "THIS IS NOT A VERY 
4 GOOD VISUAL AID." AND HE STOPPED. 
5 Q. DID YOU KNOW WHAT HE WAS DOING WHEN HE SWUNG 
6 THE AX, WHAT HE MEANT BY IT? 
7 A. NO. 
8 Q. WHAT DID YOU THINK WAS HAPPENING? 
,9 A. I THOUGHT I WAS GOING TO BE HURT. 
10 MR. ESPLIN: I'LL OBJECT TO THAT. IT'S NOT 
11 RELEVANT WHAT SHE THOUGHT. IT'S WHAT THE INTENT OF THE 
12 DEFENDANT WAS. 
13 THE COURT: I'LL SUSTAIN THE OBJECTION. 
14 Q. (BY MS. BALDWIN) WHAT HAPPENED AFTER THAT? 
15 A. HE WENT BACK TO THE CAR AND STARTED GOING 
16 BACK UP THE LITTLE INCLINE TOWARDS THE CAR. AND THEN I 
17 FOLLOWED HIM UP, AND BECAUSE LAUREN WAS STILL IN THE CAR, 
18 I WAS FRIGHTENED STILL. AND HE GOT IN THE CAR — I GUESS 
19 HE PUT THE AX IN AT SOME POINT BEFORE HE GOT BACK UP 
20 THERE, AND THEN GOT IN THE CAR. AND JAMIE AND I GOT IN 
21 THE CAR AND WE WENT BACK TO THE HOUSE. 
22 Q. WHAT HAPPENED AFTER YOU WENT BACK TO THE 
23 HOUSE? 
24 A. WE CONTINUED THE FAMILY HOME EVENING LESSON. 
25 Q. WHAT DID HE DO? 
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1 A. HE BROUGHT SOME ICE CREAM AND ICE CREAM CONES 
2 OUT. AND HE MOVED THE ICE CREAM CONES TOWARDS JAMIE AND 
3 LAUREN. AND THEN HE SAID, "THIS IS FOR YOU AND THIS IS 
4 FOR ME." AND HE WENT ON WITH THE LESSON AT HAND ABOUT 
5 WE'RE BEING SELFISH WHEN WE'RE NOT BEING REVERENT IN 
6 SACRAMENT MEETING. AND THEN SHORTLY, I GUESS, AFTER THAT 
7 HE LEFT THE HOUSE. 
8 Q. WHAT DID YOU DO? 
9 A. I WENT OUT TO THE GARAGE. I DIDN'T KNOW IF 
10 THE AX WAS GOING TO BE OUT THERE, BUT I WENT OUT TO THE 
11 GARAGE AND SAW THE AX, AND I TOOK IT OVER TO JIM ALDER'S 
12 HOUSE. 
13 Q. WHO IS HE? 
14 A. A COUNSELOR IN THE BISHOPRIC. 
15 Q. AND THEN WHAT DID YOU DO? 
16 A. I TALKED TO HIM FOR MAYBE AN HOUR — I DON'T 
17 KNOW HOW LONG EXACTLY. AND THEN I WENT BACK OVER TO THE 
18 HOUSE, AND I WAS TALKING ON THE PHONE. MY DAUGHTER, 
19 CHRIS, SAID THAT JEFF, MY SON — 
20 MR. ESPLIN: OBJECTION, YOUR HONOR. HEARSAY. 
21 THE COURT: SUSTAINED. 
22 Q. (BY MS. BALDWIN) JUST TELL ME WHAT YOU DID. 
23 A. I CALLED MY SON. I WAS RETURNING A CALL. 
24 AND I WAS TALKING ON THE PHONE TO HIM ABOUT WHAT HAD 
25 HAPPENED DURING THE DAY. AND MY HUSBAND CAME — WHO HAD 
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1 RETURNED IN THE INTERRIM PERIOD CAME DOWNSTAIRS AND 
2 STARTED YELLING AT ME, TOLD ME THAT I WAS TAKING FAMILY 
3 PROBLEMS OUTSIDE OF THE HOME. THEN HE WENT BACK 
4 UPSTAIRS, GOT ON THE PHONE AND STARTED YELLING AT MY SON. 
5 AND I ASKED MY SON TO PLEASE HANG UP THE PHONE. AND HE 
6 FINALLY DID. AND SOMEWHERE ALONG THERE MY HUSBAND WAS 
7 SAYING THAT HE WANTED A DIVORCE. 
8 THEN ANYWAYS HE LEFT AND HE CAME BACK AGAIN 
9 AND STARTED TELLING ME THAT HE WAS GOING TO TAKE MY NAME 
10 OFF THE DEED TO THE HOUSE, AND THAT HE WAS GOING TO 
11 CONTROL ALL THE MONEY AND HE WAS GOING TO CANCEL MY 
12 CLASSES AT BYU — I MEAN HE WAS SAYING OTHER THINGS. I 
13 DON'T REMEMBER EXACTLY WHAT, BUT THERE WAS ONE POINT THAT 
14 MY DAUGHTER SAID SOMETHING TO HIM AND HE PULLED HIS FIST 
15 BACK — THIS IS MY DAUGHTER, CHRIS — AND HE PULLED HIS 
16 FIST BACK AS IF HE WAS GOING TO STRIKE HER AND THEN HE 
17 SORT OF KIND OF STARTED POUNDING HIS FIST INTO HIS HAND 
18 INSTEAD OF HITTING HER. 
19 AND THEN — I DON'T KNOW, PERIODICALLY HE 
20 WOULD JUST LEAVE THE ROOM AND COME BACK WITH ANOTHER 
21 SUBJECT THAT HE WOULD WANT TO TALK ABOUT. AND THEN HE 
22 SAW BRAD GIBBONS, WHO WAS A HOUSEGUEST, STANDING IN THE 
23 HALL, AND STARTED YELLING AT HIM FOR EAVESDROPPING, AND 
24 THEN HE TOLD BRAD TO GET OUT OF THE HOUSE, AND THEN HE 
25 WENT BACK UPSTAIRS AND I STARTED PACKING MY CAR AND I 
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1 LEFT. 
2 Q. ABOUT WHAT TIME WAS THAT YOU LEFT? 
3 A. I LEFT AT 2 O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING. 
4 Q. DO YOU RECALL WHEN YOU REPORTED THIS INCIDENT 
5 TO THE POLICE? 
6 A. IT WAS LATER ON IN SEPTEMBER, I DON'T RECALL 
7 THE EXACT DATE. 
8 Q. WHY DID YOU WAIT TO REPORT IT? 
9 A. FIRST I WAS IN VIRGINIA. I HAD DRIVEN BACK 
10 ACROSS THE STATE --
11 MR. ESPLIN: I DON'T THINK THAT'S RELEVANT 
12 WHY SHE WAITED TO REPORT IT. 
13 THE COURT: I'LL PERMIT IT. GO AHEAD. 
14 THE WITNESS: WELL, I HAD DRIVEN BACK ACROSS 
15 THE STATES WITH MY CHILDREN. AND I FELT THE IMMEDIATE 
16 DANGER THAT I PERCEIVED WAS HERE AND I STARTED JUST, YOU 
17 KNOW, LOOKING FOR A JOB AND A PLACE TO STAY. AND I WAS 
18 PRETTY MUCH CONSUMED WITH JUST GETTING MY FAMILY BACK 
19 TOGETHER AT THAT PARTICULAR TIME. THEN I CALLED BRAD WHO 
20 WAS STILL HERE IN UTAH, AND ASKED HIM TO GET SOME THINGS 
21 OUT OF THE HOUSE FOR ME. AND HE — I GUESS I'M NOT QUITE 
22 SURE EXACTLY WHAT HAPPENED. HE WENT TO THE HOUSE AND I 
23 THINK MY HUSBAND STOPPED HIM FROM GETTING THESE THINGS 
24 OUT OF THE HOUSE. 
25 MR. ESPLIN: WE'LL OBJECT TO THAT. SHE 
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1 A. THAT'S WHAT IT APPEARED TO ME. 
2 Q. AS HE SWUNG HE TALKED ABOUT — HE STARTED 
3 SPEAKING LOUDLY AND SAID, "THIS IS WHAT WE DO — " 
4 A. HE SAID, "THIS IS WHAT WE DO TO THE NAME OF 
5 JESUS CHRIST." 
6 Q. HAD HE MADE ANY THREATS TO ANYBODY PRIOR TO 
7 ENTERING THE CEMETERY? 
8 A. EARLIER IN THE DAY HE SAID HE WOULD TEAR 
9 JAMIE --
10 Q. I MEAN WHEN YOU GOT TO THE CEMETERY HAD HE 
11 MADE ANY THREATS TO ANYBODY AT THAT POINT? 
12 A. NO, SIR, HE HAD NOT. 
13 Q. IN FACT, HE HAD INDICATED TO YOU HE WAS NOT 
14 GOING TO HARM ANYBODY? 
15 A. YES, HE DID SAY, "COME ON DOWN, I'M NOT GOING 
16 TO HURT YOU." 
17 Q. NOW YOU INDICATED WHEN THIS FIRST SWING CAME, 
18 JAMIE MOVED? 
19 A. YES, SHE DID. 
20 Q. DID HE STEP AROUND TOWARDS HER AND CLOSER TO 
21 HER SO HE COULD SWING AT HER WITH THE AX? 
22 A. I DON'T REMEMBER. I DON'T REMEMBER IF HE 
23 MOVED HIS FEET. I JUST REMEMBER WHEN SHE MOVED BEHIND ME 
24 AND THE AX CONTINUED SWINGING AROUND, IT WAS IN FRONT OF 
25 ME, SO HE HAD REDIRECTED THE AX SO IT WAS COMING DOWN IN 
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1 FRONT OF ME. BUT DO I THINK HE CAME AROUND ME TO HIT 
2 JAMIE? NO. 
3 Q. WHEN IT CAME TOWARDS YOU DID -- YOU WEREN'T 
4 STRUCK WITH THE AX? 
5 A. NO, I WAS NOT. 
6 Q. DID YOU MOVE BACK OUT OF THE WAY? 
7 A. I DID NOT. 
8 Q. HE DIDN'T MOVE ANY CLOSER SO HE COULD HIT YOU 
9 WITH THE AX? 
10 A. NO, BUT HE'S A TALL MAN AND HIS REACH COULD 
11 CERTAINLY HAVE MADE IT IF HE WANTED TO. 
12 Q. ARE YOU TELLING US YOU THOUGHT HE WAS GOING 
13 TO TRY AND HIT YOU WITH THE AX? 
14 A. I DON'T KNOW WHAT HIS INTENT WAS AT THE TIME. 
15 BUT I CAN TELL YOU IT WAS FRIGHTENING. 
16 Q. SO YOU WERE NOT SO MUCH FEARFUL THAT HE WAS 
17 INTENDING TO TRY AND HIT YOU, BUT HE MIGHT --
18 A. NO, THAT'S NOT WHAT I SAID. YES, I WAS 
19 AFRAID HE WAS GOING TO TRY AND HIT ME. I WAS AFRAID HE 
20 WAS GOING TO TRY AND HIT MY DAUGHTER. 
21 Q. YET YOU DIDN'T MOVE AT ALL BACK? 
22 A. NO, I DIDN'T, BECAUSE I WAS AFRAID IF I MADE 
23 ANY WRONG MOVES I DIDN'T KNOW WHAT WAS GOING TO PUSH HIM 
24 OVER THE EDGE AND HIT US. 
25 Q. AFTER THE FIRST COUPLE TIMES, THE ONE WHERE 
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1 HE SWUNG THE AX TOWARDS JAMIE, AS YOU INDICATED --
2 A. YES. 
3 Q. — IN THAT DIRECTION, AND THEN WHEN SHE MOVED 
4 BEHIND YOU, HE KIND OF REDIRECTED IT MORE TOWARDS YOUR 
5 DIRECTION? 
6 A. YES. 
7 Q. YOU SAY HE CONTINUED TO SWING THE AX; IS THAT 
8 CORRECT? 
9 A. YES, HE DID CONTINUE — 
10 Q. HE DIDN'T COME ANY CLOSER TO YOU THAN HE DID 
11 ON THE FIRST ONE? 
12 A. HE DIDN'T COME ANY CLOSER, NO. 
13 Q. SO HE WAS STILL -- WHATEVER HE WAS DOING, HE 
14 WAS SWINGING IN THE SAME FASHION AND MAKING THE 
15 STATEMENTS ABOUT REVERENCE AND JESUS CHRIST YOU ALLUDED 
16 TO? 
17 A. NOT STATEMENTS, HE WAS SCREAMING. 
18 Q. AND DID YOU GET THE IMPRESSION THAT THAT 
19 SCREAMING LOUD VOICE WAS TO SHOW THE CONTRAST BETWEEN HIS 
20 SOFT VOICE BEFORE HE WAS TALKING ABOUT REVERENCE? 
21 A. NOT AT ALL, NOT AT ALL. I DIDN'T MAKE THAT 
22 CONNECTION. 
23 Q. THERE WAS A CONTRAST ABOUT HIS CALM BEHAVIOR 
24 BEFORE AND HIS LOUD VOICE AND BEHAVIOR WHEN HE WAS 
25 SWINGING THE PICK, WAS THERE NOT? 
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1 MS. BALDWIN: PHOTOGRAPH OF THE CEMETERY. 
2 AND 3 IS A PICTURE OF THE GRAVE SITE. THE STATE RESTS. 
3 THE COURT: MR. ESPLIN. 
4 MR. ESPLIN: AT THIS'TIME I WOULD MOVE TO 
5 DISMISS. I THINK BASED UPON THE STATE'S EVIDENCE THERE'S 
6 NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE HERE THAT A JURY COULD FIND, IF 
7 BELIEVED — 
8 THE COURT: THE JURY ISN'T HERE. 
9 MR. ESPLIN: THE TRIER OF FACT, I SHOULD SAY. 
10 THE TRIER OF FACT IN THIS CASE COULD FIND SUFFICIENT 
11 EVIDENCE TO CONVICT THE DEFENDANT. IT APPEARS THE 
12 EVIDENCE IS PRETTY CONSISTENT THIS WAS A DEMONSTRATION, 
13 ALTHOUGH ILL-CONCEIVED, AND MAYBE LACKING IN TERMS OF THE 
14 HINDSIGHT, DIDN'T CARRY THE EFFECT IT INTENDED TO HAVE. 
15 I THINK THE EVIDENCE IS CLEAR THAT MR. LANDRITH, HAD HE 
16 INTENDED TO CAUSE HARM OR INJURY TO THE PARTIES OR TO ANY 
17 VICTIMS, THAT HE COULD HAVE EASILY DONE THAT BY MOVING 
18 CLOSER AND ATTEMPTING TO STRIKE THEM, WHICH HE WAS NOT 
19 DOING. I THINK IT'S OBVIOUS WHAT HE WAS DOING, FROM THE 
20 TESTIMONY; WAS ATTEMPTING TO CAUSE CONCERN ABOUT WHETHER 
21 OR NOT HE MIGHT DAMAGE THE GRAVE SITE AND TRYING TO 
22 INSTILL A CONCERN ABOUT THAT AND RELATE THAT TO A LESSON 
23 ON REVERENCE. 
24 AS I READ THE STATUTE, AND AS THE COURT WELL 
25 KNOWS, HE MUST HAVE THE INTENT TO EITHER PRODUCE DEATH OR 
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1 DO SERIOUS BODILY INJURY. I DON'T THINK THERE'S ANY 
2 QUESTION HERE THERE'S NOT THAT SHOWING. HE'S GOT TO THEN 
3 MAKE A THREAT, ACCOMPANIED BY AN IMMEDIATE SHOW OF FORCE 
4 OR VIOLENCE, WHICH THERE WAS NO THREAT MADE. OR HE'S GOT 
5 TO COMMIT AN ACT THAT CREATES A SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF DEATH 
6 OR BODILY INJURY TO ANOTHER. 
7 AND I THINK ALTHOUGH THIS ACT MAY HAVE 
8 AMOUNTED TO THE POINT WHERE IT MAY HAVE CAUSED SOME 
9 CONCERN OR FEAR OR APPREHENSION IN THE OTHERS WHO WERE 
10 THERE, IT WAS NOT DEFENDANT'S INTENTION TO CAUSE THAT; 
11 THAT HIS INTENTION WAS TO DEMONSTRATE THE OBJECT LESSON, 
12 WHICH WAS PART OF THE WHOLE DISCUSSION. AND THAT IS 
13 EVIDENT IN THE TESTIMONY OF BOTH WITNESSES WHEN THEY 
14 INDICATE WHEN SHE SAID: "STOP, YOU'RE SCARING THE 
15 CHILDREN," HE QUIT. IF IT WAS HIS INTENT TO CAUSE FEAR 
16 HE WOULD HAVE CONTINUED THAT COURSE OF ACTION, BUT I 
17 THINK EVIDENCED A LACK OF INTENT THERE. 
18 THE PARTIES THEN LEFT, WENT DOWN TO THE 
19 HOUSE, HAD ICE CREAM AND COMPLETED THE FAMILY HOME 
20 EVENING. 
21 NOW, IT'S APPARENT THERE WAS AN ARGUMENT AS 
22 FAR AS THE FAMILY WAS CONCERNED BETWEEN MR. LANDRITH AND 
23 HIS WIFE, CONCERNING SEVERAL ISSUES: WITH HOW HE DEALT 
24 WITH HER, HOW HE DEALT WITH HER CHILDREN, THOSE KINDS OF 
25 MARITAL ISSUES THAT RESULTED IN A SEPARATION. BUT THIS 
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1 ACT HERE, AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, A CRIMINAL CHARGE, I DON'T 
2 THINK THE STATE HAS MADE OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE. AND WE 
3 WOULD ASK THAT IT BE DISMISSED AT THIS TIME. 
4 THE COURT: MS. BALDWIN? 
5 MS. BALDWIN: LET ME START BACKWARDS WITH THE 
6 CODE. FOR AN AGGRAVATED ASSAULT TO OCCUR, WHAT NEEDS TO 
7 OCCUR IS AN ASSAULT THAT INTENTIONALLY CAUSES SERIOUS 
8 BODILY INJURY OR USES A DANGEROUS WEAPON. THERE'S NO 
9 INJURY HERE, SO WE CAN DISMISS BOTH THE AGGRAVATED 
10 ASSAULT AND ASSAULT PORTIONS THAT INCLUDE THAT. I DON'T 
11 THINK THERE'S ANY QUESTION THAT THIS COULD BE CONSIDERED 
12 A DANGEROUS WEAPON. 
13 WHEN MR. ESPLIN TALKS ABOUT INTENT, I THINK 
14 HE MISREADS THE CASE LAW AS FAR AS WHAT INTENT IS 
15 REQUIRED. IT IS NOT AN INTENT TO CAUSE SERIOUS BODILY 
16 INJURY — WELL, THAT'S INCORRECT. THE FIRST SUBSECTION 
17 DOES REQUIRE A SPECIFIC INTENT TO CAUSE BODILY INJURY. 
18 THE OTHER TWO SUBSECTIONS HAVE SPECIFICALLY BEEN FOUND BY 
19 CASE LAW TO REQUIRE A GENERAL INTENT, WHICH IS AN INTENT 
20 TO COMMIT THE ACT. IN THIS CASE THAT WOULD BE THE INTENT 
21 TO SWING THE AX, AND EVEN THE INTENT TO SWING THE AX IN 
22 THE DIRECTION OF THOSE INDIVIDUALS. 
23 TRADITIONALLY WHEN YOU HAVE AN ASSAULT THERE 
24 IS SOME KIND OF VERBAL THREAT. HOWEVER, THERE IS CASE 
25 LAW THAT SUBSTANTIATES THE ARGUMENT THAT CERTAIN ACTS CAN 
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1 BE CONSIDERED BY THEMSELVES, IN AND OF THEMSELVES AS A 
2 THREAT. SPECIFICALLY, I THINK THE CASE IS STATE VERSUS 
3 OLDROYD, WHERE THERE WAS A POLICE OFFICER WHO ENTERED A 
4 DARK STAIRWAY, SHINES HIS FLASHLIGHT DOWN THE STEPS, SAW 
5 AN INDIVIDUAL SITTING ON THE STEPS WITH A PISTOL POINTED 
6 TOWARDS THE OFFICER. AND THERE WAS DEBATE FACTUALLY 
7 WHETHER THERE WAS A CLICK THAT WOULD INDICATE THE GUN WAS 
8 BEING COCKED OR NOT. AND THAT WAS HELD BY THE COURT TO 
9 BE SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A VERDICT OF AN AGGRAVATED 
10 ASSAULT. 
11 BUT THE STATE'S, I BELIEVE, STRONGEST 
12 POSITION IS IN SUBSECTION C OF THE ASSAULT CODE, WHICH 
13 DESCRIBES IT AS, "AN ACT, COMMITTED WITH UNLAWFUL FORCE 
14 OR VIOLENCE, THAT CAUSES OR CREATES A SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF 
15 BODILY INJURY TO ANOTHER." 
16 THERE IS NO LAWFUL REASON TO SWING AN AX IN 
17 ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL'S DIRECTION. THAT ACT WAS UNLAWFUL, 
18 AND IT DID CREATE A SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF BODILY INJURY. 
19 ONE SLIP AND SOMEBODY COULD HAVE BEEN SERIOUSLY INJURED 
20 OR KILLED. THEREFORE, IT DOES MEET THE ELEMENTS NOT ONLY 
21 AS PRIMA FACIE, BUT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT AS 
22 AGGRAVATED ASSAULT. 
23 THE COURT: MR. ESPLIN. 
24 MR. ESPLIN: I DISAGREE WITH COUNSEL AS TO 
25 HER STATEMENT OF REQUIREMENT OF INTENT. I THINK THERE'S 
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1 ALWAYS GOT TO BE AN INTENT UNLESS THE ELEMENT IS 
2 RECKLESSNESS OR CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE. IN THIS CASE HAD 
3 MR. LANDRITH — SAY IT WAS GIVEN HIS INTENT -- SAY HE WAS 
4 CHOPPING A BRANCH OR A LIMB WITH AN AX AND ONE OF HIS 
5 DAUGHTERS WAS STANDING NEXT TO IT AND HE STRUCK HER FOOT 
6 AND INJURED IT. YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT NEGLIGENCE. 
7 THERE'S NOTHING UNLAWFUL ABOUT WHAT HE WAS DOING. HE WAS 
8 TRYING TO DEMONSTRATE A POINT. HE DID NOT STRIKE THE 
9 GRAVE SITE. HE DIDN'T STRIKE ANY PERSON. SO I DON'T 
10 KNOW WHERE WE GET THE UNLAWFUL FORCE OR VIOLENCE. 
11 THERE'S A BIG DIFFERENCE BETWEEN COCKING A GUN AND 
12 POINTING A FIREARM AT A POLICE OFFICER AND TRYING TO 
13 DEMONSTRATE A PRINCIPAL OF REVERENCE WITH YOUR FAMILY. 
14 IF YOUR INTENT IS TO TRY AND DEMONSTRATE THAT, THEN I 
15 DON'T THINK YOU HAVE A CRIMINAL ACT. 
16 UNDER THE SECTION 76-2-101, IT DEFINES 
17 CRIMINAL CONDUCT AS "INTENTIONALLY, KNOWINGLY, 
18 RECKLESSLY, WITH CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE, OR WITH THE MENTAL 
19 STATE AS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED." MENTAL STATE DOES NOT FIT 
20 ANY OF THOSE IN ANY WAY. AND TO IMPOSE CRIMINAL 
21 LIABILITY ON THEM, AGAIN, WOULD BE COMPARABLE TO SOMEONE 
22 WHO ON HALLOWEEN, SOMEONE WHO IS DRESSED UP AS A CHAINSAW 
23 MASSACRE PERSON, JUMPING INTO A ROOM WHERE HE'S UNAWARE 
24 THERE ARE PEOPLE -- THAT THERE ARE FOREIGN PEOPLE UNAWARE 
25 OF HALLOWEEN AND SAYING HE SCARED EVERYBODY, AND SAYING 
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1 WE HAVE TO CHARGE HIM BECAUSE THEY WERE SCARED WHEN HE 
2 HAD NO INTENT TO DO ANYTHING. I DON'T THINK THEY HAVE 
3 MADE OUT A BASIC CASE HERE. HE WASN'T TRYING TO HURT 
4 THOSE PEOPLE. HE WASN'T TRYING TO DO ANYTHING UNLAWFUL. 
5 AND WITHOUT THAT YOU DON'T HAVE AN AGGRAVATED ASSAULT. 
6 YOU DON'T EVEN HAVE A SIMPLE ASSAULT. NO THREATS, NO 
7 INDICATION HE TRIED TO DO ANYTHING. THE CONDUCT 
8 AFTERWARDS DEMONSTRATES THAT. THEY WENT BACK, HAD ICE 
9 CREAM AND FINISHED THE FAMILY HOME EVENING. AND UNDER 
10 THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, YOUR HONOR, THIS IS NOT AN 
11 AGGRAVATED ASSAULT. 
12 THE COURT: WELL, COUNSEL, I'M INCLINED TO 
13 AGREE WITH THE DEFENDANT. THE ONLY THING THAT TROUBLES 
14 ME IS WHETHER THE — I HAVE TO DISAGREE WITH ONE PART OF 
15 WHAT YOU SAY, AND THAT IS I THINK A PERSON CAN BE PLACED 
16 IN REASONABLE APPREHENSION, WHICH CAN AMOUNT TO THE 
17 NECESSARY ASSAULT AND APPARENT DANGER THAT'S THERE 
18 WITHOUT STRIKING A BLOW AND WITHOUT COCKING THE GUN. I 
19 THINK THAT CAN HAPPEN. AND I'M SOMEWHAT UNSURE IN THAT 
20 AREA. I THINK, COUNSEL, WHAT I WOULD LIKE TO DO IS TAKE 
21 THE MATTER UNDER ADVISEMENT AND READ SOME CASES ON INTENT 
22 AND SATISFY MYSELF IN THAT AREA. AND SO I'M GOING TO DO 
23 THAT. I'M NOT READY TO SAY THERE IS NO — THE STATE HAS 
24 NOT PROVED THEIR CASE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. I NEED 
25 TO BE SATISFIED IN THAT AREA. 
CREED H. BARKER, CSR 
56 
1 MR. ESPLIN: I WOULD THEN PUT ON THE STAND 
2 MR. LANDRITH AS A WITNESS. LANEY, IF YOU WOULD TAKE THE 
3 STAND. 
4 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT, IF YOU WOULD COME 
5 FORWARD AND RAISE YOUR HAND. 
6 
7 GEORGE CLAY LANDRITH, JR. 
8 CALLED AS A WITNESS HEREIN, HAVING BEEN DULY 
9 SWORN, WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
10 
11 THE COURT: BE SEATED IN THE WITNESS CHAIR, 
12 PLEASE. 
13 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
14 BY MR. ESPLIN: 
15 Q. STATE YOUR NAME AND ADDRESS. 
16 A. GEORGE CLAY LANDRITH, JR. 892 OSMOND LANE, 
17 PROVO. 
18 Q. YOU'RE ACQUAINTED WITH THE PRIOR TWO 
19 WITNESSES, JAMIE AND SUSAN? 
20 A. YES. 
21 Q. YOU'RE STILL MARRIED TO SUSAN? 
22 A. YES. 
23 Q. TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE HAVE ANY DIVORCE 
24 PROCEEDINGS BEEN INITIATED YET? 
25 A. NO. 
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